Smashing the Copyright Act to Make Room for the Mashup Artist: How a Four-Tiered Matrix Better Accommodates Evolving Technology and Needs of the Entertainment Industry by Kinsey, Caroline
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 35 | Number 2 Article 3
1-1-2013
Smashing the Copyright Act to Make Room for the
Mashup Artist: How a Four-Tiered Matrix Better
Accommodates Evolving Technology and Needs
of the Entertainment Industry
Caroline Kinsey
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Caroline Kinsey, Smashing the Copyright Act to Make Room for the Mashup Artist: How a Four-Tiered Matrix Better Accommodates
Evolving Technology and Needs of the Entertainment Industry, 35 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 303 (2013).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol35/iss2/3
   
303 
Smashing the Copyright Act to Make 
Room for the Mashup Artist: 
How a Four-Tiered Matrix Better 
Accommodates Evolving Technology and 
Needs of the Entertainment Industry 
by 
CAROLINE KINSEY∗
I. Introduction .......................................................................................................................
 
303
II. Defining the Mashup and its Role in the Entertainment Industry ...............................306
A. The Mashup ................................................................................................................306
B. How Mashups conflict with copyright holder concerns .........................................307
III. The Fair Use Doctrine ......................................................................................................308
A. Elements of Fair Use .................................................................................................308
B. Problems With the Fair Use Doctrine as Applied to Mashups .............................314
IV. Alternative Solutions to Fair Use ....................................................................................315
V. Proposal for Reform .........................................................................................................322
A. Regulating the Internet .............................................................................................322
B. Imposition of a Four-Tiered Matrix .........................................................................324
VI.  Conclusion .........................................................................................................................329
In truth, literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, 
things which in an abstract sense are strictly new and original throughout. 
Every book in literature, science, and art borrows, and must necessarily 
borrow, and use much which was well known and used before.
1
-Joseph Story
I. Introduction
With the rise of online blogging, social networking platforms, and 
video-sharing sites such as YouTube and Yahoo Video, it is now 
∗ Professor & Public Interest Fellow, Small Business & Nonprofit Clinic, Michigan State 
University College of Law.  Michigan State University College of Law (L.L.M./M.J., 
Intellectual Property, 2012).   The author would like to thank Barry and Dr. Maryann 
Kinsey for their support. 
1. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
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possible for one individual to rival the span of entire media empires 
from one’s basement computer.  Commonly known as the Web 2.0 
phenomenon, the combination of these technological advancements 
with video platforms that encourage users to “engage, create, and 
share content online” 2  has fundamentally transformed the music 
industry.  No longer are fans passive listeners, but instead, with the 
click of a mouse and access to the Internet, they become 
“publisher[s], TV network[s], radio station[s], movie studio[s], record 
label[s], and newspaper[s], all wrapped into one.”3
This article evaluates the current liability of Mashup Artists, those 
whom are, for purposes of this article, “individuals who develop video 
or audio works comprised of two or more segments of pre-existing 
copyrighted material for personal use, distribution on the Internet, or 
profit.”
 
4  As the Mashup Artist’s creation is often neither entirely the 
product of his own creativity, nor distributed online with the original 
copyright holder’s permission, he may automatically be deemed a 
copyright infringer when publishing his work.  Thus, he is only able to 
seek refuge under the fair use doctrine, 5  a four-factor analysis 
described by critics as “a risky proposition”6
In recognizing that moral rights
 and “an impediment 
to . . . profitable return on digital, remixed creative labor.” 
7
2. Edward Lee, Developing Copyright Practices for User-Generated Content, 13 J. 
INTERNET  L. 1, 1 (2009). 
 concerns are outweighed by the 
overwhelming need to develop new methods to better accommodate 
the evolving needs of the Mashup Artist and ensure protection to the 
original copyright holder in this digital age, copyright theorists have 
established several alternative methods to fair use.  To satisfy the 
intricate balance between sampling and stealing without inhibiting the 
First Amendment goals and historical aims of copyright law, these 
theorists suggest measures such as establishing a compulsory licensing 
3. Id. at 13.
4. I refer to the works created by Mashup Artists as either “Mashup” or “Mashups.”
5. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
6. Michael Katz, Recycling Copyright: Survival and Growth in the Remix Age, Univ.
S.F. From the Selected Works of Michael Katz (Oct. 2008) 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=michael_katz (“The 
distinction between fair use and infringement isn’t easily defined, as the Copyright Office 
puts it.”). 
7. Although not recognized within the Copyright Act, an Artist’s “moral rights”
generally consist of the right to “create a work, to display the work to the public in 
whatever form he or she chooses, to withhold the creation from the public, and to demand 
respect for his or her personality as the creator of a work.” Martin A. Roeder, The 
Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artist, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. 
REV. 554, 578 (1940). 
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system, relaxing market economic structure, or using a sound 
recording collective.  Theorists also recommend reverting to contract 
law principles and allowing individual recording labels or production 
studios to develop their own regulations should a Mashup Artist wish 
to use their copyrighted works in his creation. 
The purpose of this article is to advocate for the restructuring of 
current copyright law to impose heightened requirements on social 
and video-sharing networks and include a four-tiered matrix 
exclusively designed to assess copyright issues relating to Mashups.  
Not only is this matrix consistent with the constitutionally mandated 
policy goal of the Copyright Act to promote “the [p]rogress of 
[s]cience and useful [a]rts,”8
In making this recommendation, this article begins by elaborating 
on the definition of “Mashup,” explaining the expanding role of the 
Mashup Artist, and elaborating on the current conflict between 
copyright holders and Mashup Artists.  The article next examines the 
fair use doctrine as it pertains to Mashups and summarizes why the 
protection it affords Mashup Artists is insufficient and fails to 
recognize the overwhelming public value Mashups impose on society. 
The article then identifies alternative solutions proposed by copyright 
theorists and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of each 
recommended mechanism.  It concludes by encouraging the United 
States Copyright Office to impose heightened requirements on social 
and video-sharing online networks and expand the Copyright Act to 
include a four-tiered matrix that outlines the various requirements a 
Mashup Artist must follow in order for his work to be immune from 
infringement claims.  Each tier of the matrix reflects a series of factors 
particular to the created Mashup, including the location where it may 
be found and whether it serves a commercial purpose.  Based on 
where a Mashup Artist’s creation falls, he may have no 
responsibilities to the original copyright holder or may be forced to 
pay a set fee that corresponds with the length and type of each 
copyrighted work incorporated.  In promoting this matrix as the ideal 
mechanism to combat arbitrariness within the fair use doctrine, this 
article elaborates on its strengths, refutes criticisms surrounding its 
recommendation, and emphasizes how this mechanism is superior to 
suggested alternatives. 
 but it also eliminates the arbitrariness 
inherent in the current fair use doctrine, and provides Mashup Artists 
with a level of clarity in how they may properly use copyrighted 
works in their creation. 
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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II. Defining the Mashup and its Role in the Entertainment
Industry 
A. The Mashup
Absent from most dictionaries, the term “Mashup” has multiple
meanings depending on the context in which it is used.  It may refer 
to “a musical or audiovisual work that consists entirely of parts of 
other songs or videos” 9 or “an offspring of sampling that mixes 
together two or more records to create a new song.”10
As the definition of Mashup varies in form, so does the Mashup 
itself, as it is incredibly flexible and its possibilities are endless.  For 
example, a Mashup may be developed for a commercial or non-
commercial purpose, displayed privately on a home computer or 
publicly through world-wide video-sharing sites such as Youtube and 
Yahoo Video, and include two or two-hundred-thousand copyrighted 
works at one or one-hundred minutes apiece, lasting thirty seconds or 
thirty days in length.  Because the Mashup lacks consistency in its 
definition, it also may pertain to sculptures, paintings, video, audio or 
audio-visual works.  It also could include any combination of these art 
forms. 
 
For the purposes of this article, the Mashup is “any video or audio 
work comprised of two or more segments of pre-existing copyrighted 
material.”  This article explicitly excludes tangible art forms from the 
definition for two main reasons.  First, absent the computer’s ability 
to digitize visual artwork, it is frequently difficult, costly, and time 
consuming to accurately and objectively measure the amount of 
copyrighted material used in the creation of a painting, drawing or 
sculpture.  Second, because digital technology empowers users from 
all backgrounds with all levels of ability to create music and videos 
that can be disseminated world-wide through the use of the internet 
in a cost-efficient, instantaneous manner, audio and video mashups 
presently impose a greater threat to the original copyright holder’s 
rights than visual art.  This definition does not restrict future scholars 
from expanding it to encompass visual artwork, but only mandates 
that, for the purpose of this article, Mashups solely include video and 
audio works. 
9. James De Los Reyes, Examining Copyright Exemptions for Web Mashups in the
International Context: Applying American Constitutional Considerations as Guidepost for 
the Trips Three-Step Test, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 473, 476 (2011). 
10. Jeffrey Omari, The Digital Sampling of Music Has Stretched the Meaning of the
Fair Use Doctrine, L.A. LAWYER, Sept. 2010 at 35, 38. 
   
2013] SMASHING THE COPYRIGHT ACT 307 
B. How Mashups Conflict with Copyright Holder Concerns
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power “to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . 
Writings.”  In conjunction with this authority, Congress, via section 
106 of the 1976 Copyright Act (hereinafter, “Copyright Act”), 11 
established six exclusive rights authors would automatically retain in 
their original, copyrighted works.  Included in these rights are the 
rights to: (1) “reproduce the copyrighted work in copies,” 12  (2) 
“distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public . . . ,”13 (3) 
“. . . perform the copyrighted work publicly,” 14  (4) and “prepare 
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”15
Included within section 101 of the Copyright Act,
  It is the fourth 
exclusive right mentioned, the right to prepare derivative works, 
where the majority of contention lies between the Mashup Artist and 
the original author or copyright holder. 
16 the term 
‘derivative work’ is defined as “a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a . . . musical arrangement . . . motion 
picture version, sound recording . . . or any other form in which a 
work may be recast . . . .”17  The overwhelming concern asserted by 
copyright holders is that the Mashup Artist’s use of their copyrighted 
material without seeking advance permission to do so infringes upon 
their exclusive right under section 106 to create a derivative work 
from that copyrighted material.  This theory is predicated upon the 
belief that Mashups are included within the definition of a derivative 
work, and as such, when someone other than the original copyright 
holder creates a Mashup, he has automatically infringed on the 
copyright holder’s exclusive rights and must be held liable for this 
infringement.18
Courts are not easily persuaded by this argument, however, and 
although they neglect to provide Mashup Artists with guidance as to 
the “quantum of similarity . . . necessary to become liable for 
 
11. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
12. Id. at  § 106(1).
13. Id. at § 106(3).
14. Id. at § 106(4).
15. Id. at § 106 (2).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
17. Id.
18. Omari, supra note 10, at 35.
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infringement,” 19  they seldom find a Mashup Artist liable to the 
original copyright holder solely on the basis that the Mashup may be 
viewed as derivative, despite the fact that even “a very small amount 
of expression [taken] from a copyrighted work” 20  may result in 
copyright infringement under the derivative works right.  Instead, 
even if the copyright holder argues the Mashup is a derivative work, a 
Mashup Artist’s use of the copyrighted material may be considered 
‘fair’ under 17 U.S.C. § 107, so long as it has a transformative, creative 
purpose and adequately satisfies the four factors established within 
the fair use doctrine.21
III. The Fair Use Doctrine
 
A. Elements of Fair Use
With rapid growth in the technology utilized by Mashup Artists in
developing their creations, and an increase in the amount of 
individuals beginning to combine copyrighted materials to create 
‘new’ works,22 concerns surrounding compliance with copyright laws 
have become increasingly pervasive, as Mashup Artists use 
copyrighted material in a manner often not intended by the original 
rights-holders.  As a result of this unauthorized and unintended use, 
should the Mashup Artist become threatened with an infringement 
claim his only recourse is to seek refuge under the fair use doctrine,23 
a mechanism defined by the United States Supreme Court as “a 
privilege in others than the owner of the copyright to use the 
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent.”24
Although designed to ensure the use of copyrighted materials by 
those who have not received permission from the original copyright 
holder is fair, the fair use doctrine—in practice and pertaining to 
Mashups—is anything but.  It is filled with multiple uncertainties 
 
19. Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1220
(1997). 
20. Id.
21. R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31
COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 467, 494 (2008). 
22. Andrew S. Long, Mashed Up Videos and Broken Down Copyright: Changing
Copyright to Promote the First Amendment Values of the Transformative Video, 60 OKLA. 
L. REV. 317 (2007) (“In 2004, over fifty-three million people, accounting for forty-four
percent of Internet users, uploaded user created data or videos onto the Internet.”).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
24. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985)
(quoting HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 
(1944)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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resulting from the user’s ability to easily combine multiple 
copyrighted works for international dissemination in the manner of 
his choosing while incurring little, if any, financial expense during the 
creative process. 
Included within section 107 of the Copyright Act, the fair use 
doctrine “permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright 
statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which 
[the] law is designed to foster.”25  To determine whether a Mashup 
Artist’s appropriation of the copyrighted material in his creation is 
fair, courts must consider four factors.26
The first factor requires courts to evaluate “the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for non-profit educational purposes.”
  Each factor is individually 
assessed and evaluated with flexibility and discretion. 
27 The rationale 
behind this factor is to determine if the newly created Mashup 
threatens the market value of the original copyrighted material.  It 
also assesses the extent to which the Mashup transforms the original 
work into something innovative and unique.  Transformativeness, 
generally defined by the fair use doctrine as including “something 
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first 
with new expression, meaning, or message,” is imperative in 
examining the liability of Mashup Artists under this factor, as “the 
more transformative the new work, the less [significance the other 
three factors will have, even if they] . . . weigh against a finding of fair 
use.”28
In determining whether Mashup Artists are likely to prevail under 
this first factor, courts will consider the distribution of their work, i.e., 
whether the Mashup is purely for personal use, disseminated via 
online video-sharing networks, or developed solely for a commercial 
purpose.  Courts will also review the message the Mashup presents, 
looking to whether it is identical to that of the original copyright 
holders, or whether it aggregates those copyrighted works to create a 
new art form with an entirely original message. 
  In looking to whether a work is transformative, courts often 
ask whether the Mashup could serve as a supplement to or 
replacement for the original copyrighted work. 
25. Steward v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). 
26. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (“the factors to be considered shall include . . . ”).
27. Id. at § 107(1).
28. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
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The problem with this factor of fair use, as it pertains to Mashups, 
is that it is purely subjective and difficult for judges to determine the 
degree to which a message may be altered so that it no longer violates 
the copyright holder’s rights to the original work.  With the broad 
definition of transformativeness, the likelihood for arbitrariness is 
rampant, since every Mashup Artist is likely to believe his or her 
work is “something new,” and judges are presented with little 
guidance in determining the amount of change a copyrighted work 
must undergo before it may be deemed new.  Further, this factor 
lacks uniformity, as two separate Mashups that appear to transform 
the original works in a like fashion may receive different treatment. 
Moreover, because Mashups are often published via online video-
sharing networks, it is difficult for a court to determine the 
commercial value of a Mashup.  This is especially so if the Mashup 
Artist does not directly profit from his work, as the majority of these 
file-sharing networks generate profits from advertising based on the 
success and popularity of the published Mashup. 
Under the second factor, the fair use doctrine requires courts to 
evaluate “the nature of the copyrighted work.”29  The purpose of this 
element is to assess the originality of the copyrighted work used 
within the Mashup and delve into whether it is an “original creative 
expression,”30 or a mere “recitation of factual information,” since 
mere facts alone are not eligible for protection under the Copyright 
Act,31 and may be reproduced by the Mashup Artist in his creation. 
As such, stronger protection under this factor is most often given to 
fictional and highly creative works as opposed to mere ideas, facts, 
formulas or processes.32  Under this prong, the court will also examine 
whether the original copyright holder has previously exercised his 
right to publish the copyrighted work.  This element is particularly 
important, as the original author traditionally retains a significant 
interest in “controlling the circumstances of the first public revelation 
of his work33 and his right, if he so chooses, not to publish at all.”34
The preeminent concern with this factor is that it is outdated. 
Although at the time the fair use doctrine was adopted it may have 
  
29. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006).
30. Campbell,  510 U.S. at 586.
31. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
32. Jon M. Garon, Fair Use Documentaries GALLAGHER, CALLAHAN, & GARTRELL 
(Dec. 2009), http://www.gcglaw.com/resources/entertainment/fair_use.html. 
33. Harper & Row, 471 U.S.at 552-55.
34. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1118
(1990). 
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been easy to determine the particular ‘nature’ of a copyrighted work, 
or whether it had been published, due to the technological advances 
surrounding the Web 2.0 phenomenon, present-day determination of 
whether a work has been published is not as easily made.  Today, 
publication may include a video posted once on a family member’s 
Facebook wall, a Mashup Artist’s private Myspace page, or a song 
played for family and friends outside at a local park. 
The third factor requires courts to examine “the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work 
as a whole.”35  This factor, like the first, considers the purpose and 
character of the copyrighted material, but does so in a different 
manner.  Emphasis is placed upon the substantive elements of the 
copyrighted work and the significance of the material taken from the 
copyrighted work, instead of on the ultimate purpose behind the 
copyrighted creation.  In determining whether a fair use violation has 
occurred under this element, the court must balance the quantity of 
the copyrighted material appropriated by the Mashup Artist with the 
“significance of the material taken from the copyrighted work.”36 
Quantity is not necessarily commensurate with duration under this 
factor; a Mashup Artist’s use of an entire copyrighted work may not 
oppose a finding of fair use, while the copying of a mere several 
seconds may.37
This factor does not provide adequate protection to Mashup 
Artists, as it fails to impose a uniform way for judges to determine the 
substantiality of a particular excerpt from a copyrighted work.  As 
audio-visual works often impose multiple messages at one time that 
may be interpreted differently by each listener or viewer, it is 
impossible for courts to apply this factor to Mashups in a uniform 
fashion.  The author of the copyrighted material may identify one 
particular clip or series of chords as the substantial part of the 
copyrighted work, while the consumer or Mashup Artist may render 
that excerpt as mere surplus.  Judges are often not musical composers 
or television producers, and should not be forced to determine 
something as subjective as identifying whether a particular section of 
copyrighted material may be deemed significant to the copyrighted 
work as a whole, particularly when the creative expression of the 
Mashup Artist is at stake.  Because of judicial discrepancy as to what 
may classify as a ‘substantial’ portion of a copyrighted work, this third 
 
35. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006).
36. Long, supra note 22, at 332.
37. Id.
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factor eliminates all elements of predictability within the fair use 
doctrine, and leaves the Mashup Artist with no indication as to the 
amount or type of appropriation that would constitute infringement. 
The final factor has been described by the United States Supreme 
Court as “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair 
use”38 and requires courts to evaluate the effect the Mashup has 
“upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work” as a 
whole.39  In determining if this element has been met, courts look to 
whether the Mashup usurps the market’s need for or serves as a 
substitute to the copyrighted material.40  In rendering this decision, 
the court evaluates not only the harm the Mashup imposes on the 
copyrighted material, but also the harm that may be imposed on any 
derivative works the copyright holder may produce at a later date.41 
Mashups that serve as a mere replacements for copyrighted material 
frequently fail under this element, as their creation often involves 
little creativity, and the Mashup Artist’s role becomes that of  pirate 
instead of creator.  The justification for examining the Mashup’s 
effect on the market is to ensure that the traditional aims of copyright 
law are not ignored and that future artistry and creativity is not 
stifled.42  To promote through the creation of new and innovative 
works, courts apply this fourth factor to prevent copyright holders 
from barring innovation, particularly on the basis of competition. 
Copyright holders are unlikely to succeed in initiating an claim 
against a Mashup Artist’s creation solely on the basis that the Mashup 
may negatively affect the market value of the copyrighted material.43
Although this fourth factor seldom weighs against Mashup Artists 
due to the fact that the majority of Mashups are unlikely to be proven 
as “market substitutes” for the original copyrighted material,
  
This element does not, however, give the copyright holder the 
exclusive right to control all purchasing decisions made by the 
consumer. 
44
38. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
 the 
wide array of judgments issued nationwide evidence that there is no 
39. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006).
40. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. V. Universal Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)). 
41. Long, supra note 22, at 333.
42. Id. (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567-69).
43. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523– 24 (9th Cir. 1992).
44. Michael Allyn Pote, Mashed-Up in Between: The Delicate Balance of Artists’
Interests Lost Amidst the War on Copyright, 88 N.C. L. REV. 639, 690 (2010). 
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single way this factor may be analyzed.45
The following two decisions rendered by the United States Court 
of Claims and the Second Circuit provide an accurate example of 
these contradictory viewpoints expressed by courts in assessing this 
fourth factor.  In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, the United 
States Court of Claims determined it would be wrong to “measure the 
detriment to [the copyright holder] by loss of presumed royalty 
income” from a non-existent future market,
  This judicial discrepancy is 
due largely in part to the fact that the fourth factor is stated in such a 
broad manner that it fails to inform courts as to whether emphasis 
should be placed on the present or future market, and the amount of 
attention that must be given to imaginary derivative works not yet 
developed by the copyright holder. 
46 limiting the scope of this 
fourth prong solely to the impact the appropriated work had on the 
current market.  Expressing a dramatically opposing viewpoint, the 
Second Circuit, in Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v. 
American Broadcasting, 47  evaluated the fourth factor in terms of 
whether a future market and not-yet-developed derivative work 
would suffer harm as a result of the appropriated work.  In making 
this evaluation, the court neglected to evaluate whether the copyright 
holder had any intention to exercise his section 10648
Because of the disparity amongst the judicial system in evaluating 
this element of fair use, it is inherently biased against Mashup 
creators, as courts retain discretion to review the market effects that 
an already developed Mashup may impose upon a derivative work 
not even in existence.  This comparison may be made even when the 
original copyright holder has failed to demonstrate intent to create a 
derivative work.  Not only does this factor allow courts to consider 
hypothetical derivative works in assessing the liability of a Mashup 
Artist, but it also enables these courts to create hypothetical markets 
composed of non-existent consumers and imaginary technologies, all 
of which automatically give the original copyright holder the upper 
hand in the fair use debate. 
 right to create a 
derivative work from the copyrighted material. 
45. Haochen Sun, Overcoming the Achilles Heel of Copyright Law, 5 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 265, 290 (2007). 
46. 487 F.2d 1345, 1357 n.19 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
47. 621 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1980).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
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B. Problems With the Fair Use Doctrine as Applied to Mashups
With the emergence of social and video sharing-networks, the fair
use doctrine inadequately addresses concerns of Mashup Artists as it 
treats Mashup Artists like enterprise-level pirates,49 is concerned with 
protecting the commercial function of a work rather than securing a 
composition’s social value,50 requires Mashup Artists to pay to defend 
their work should it be challenged with an infringement claim—even 
if their creation is non-commercial,51 and prevents Mashup Artists 
from making a living, as they are is rarely able to sell their creations 
without inviting threats of infringement from copyright holders.52
The fair use doctrine is outdated in that it fails to adequately 
address the disconnect between “what current copyright law protects 
and how people [presently] create” with the aid of modern 
technology.
  In 
addition to this myriad of concerns, the fair use doctrine is outdated, 
ambiguous, and disregards the legitimate social and political functions 
Mashups serve in today’s society. 
53 No longer are consumers passive listeners; with the 
emergence of the Web 2.0 phenomenon, users have started “taking 
control of technology and making culture instead of consuming it.”54  
Modern day users crave innovation, communication and mass 
networking, and strive to develop new ways to connect and obtain 
control of technological advancements.55  In neglecting to impose a 
provision specifically tailored to address this modern-day technology, 
the fair use doctrine leaves the user’s interest in creation unprotected 
and directly contravenes copyright’s intended purpose of 
“encourag[ing] and reward[ing] the development of creative works 
for the betterment of society.”56
The fair use doctrine is ambiguous, as it neglects to provide 
Mashup Artists with clear standards as to what may and may not be 
considered ‘fair’ use under the Copyright Act.
 
57
49. Katz, supra note 6, at 38.
  As fair use is 
50. Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses: A Manifesto for
User-Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921, 954 (2009). 
51. Katz, supra note 6, at 26.
52. See Grand Upright Music v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F.Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.
1991)(finding all unauthorized sampling legally suspect and susceptible to infringement 
allegations). 
53. Halbert, supra note 50, at 921.
54. Id. at 923.
55. Mark Dominiak, ‘Millenials’ Defying the Old Models; Younger Online Consumers
Leaning More Toward User-Generated Content, TELEVISION WK., May 7, 2007 at 68. 
56. Katz, supra note 6, at 2.
57. See generally, Halbert, supra note 50.
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analyzed in a case-by-case manner, the Mashup Artist is neither 
provided with information outlining the amount of work he may 
appropriate, nor given a description of the specific elements of the 
copyrighted work he may appropriate before he is automatically 
deemed an infringer.  This lack of uniformity is likely to stifle 
innovation, as Mashup Artists may be less likely to create if they are 
uncertain as to whether they will be charged with infringement upon 
publication of their work.  As user-generated creative works begin to 
increase in popularity, the Copyright Act must adapt to provide the 
Mashup Artist with a broader and more consistent level of protection. 
The fair use doctrine disregards the legitimate social and political 
functions Mashups serve in today’s society.  Although viewed by the 
majority of the entertainment industry as inherently destructive, 
Mashups can and often do serve productive, socially desirable 
purposes consistent with the Copyright Act, as they unite viewers 
throughout the world, invite user commentary, welcome criticism, 
and aid in the development of positive self-expression and self-
definition.58  Additionally, Mashups enhance First Amendment values 
by fostering a safe outlet where society may “adopt, modify, reject 
[and] question” copyrighted creations.59
IV. Alternative Solutions to Fair Use
 
Due to the aforementioned flaws with the fair use doctrine as 
applied to Mashups and the Web 2.0 phenomenon, a new mechanism 
must be constructed to better balance the Mashup Artist’s right to 
create with the copyright owner’s interest in profiting from his work. 
In struggling to develop a system that achieves uniformity and 
eliminates uncertainty within the Mashup community, copyright 
theorists such as William W. Fisher, Brian Pearl, Pamela Samuelson, 
Abigail De Kosnik, and Michael W. Carroll have proposed several 
alternative systems for compensating copyright holders when Mashup 
Artists use their copyrighted material in creating a new work.  These 
alternative systems are not exhaustive, but merely demonstrate the 
wide range of recommendations made by copyright scholars to 
restructure fair use.  While these solutions may prove meritorious in 
providing proper justice to either the Mashup Artist, consumer or 
58. Jane C. Ginsburg, User-Generated Content Sites and Section 512 of the U.S.
Copyright Act in COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT AND THE INTERNET 183, 184 (2010), 
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1084&context=columbia_pllt (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
59. Rebecca Tushnet, Hybrid Vigor: Mashups, Cyborgs, and Other Necessary
Monsters, 6 J. L. & POL’Y. INFO. SOC’Y. 1, 2 (2010). 
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copyright holder, none of the following proposals adequately address 
the concerns of all three, and each recommendation leaves many 
important questions and concerns unanswered. 
In his book, “Promises to Keep: Technology, Law and the Future 
of Entertainment,”60 William W. Fisher, III outlines three alternative 
solutions to better address the technological advances that have 
developed as a result of the Web 2.0 phenomenon.  Fisher’s primary 
scheme, which he describes as designed “explicitly . . . to protect 
creators, as a class, against injury,”61 recommends transforming the 
entire copyright system into an administrative system resembling that 
of an involuntary license.  Under this theory, if a copyright owner 
wanted to be compensated when a Mashup Artist used any quantity 
of his copyrighted material, he would register his copyright with the 
United States Copyright Office in advance and pay a designated fee 
for the registration.62  Once the material was registered, the copyright 
holder would receive a “unique file name, which . . . would be used to 
track . . . distribution, consumption and modification” 63  of the 
copyrighted material.  The government would then compensate the 
copyright holder through taxes imposed on everyday entertainment 
and electronic items such as MP3 players, cable boxes, and personal 
computers after determining the “frequency with which each song 
and film was listened to or watched.”64  The amount of compensation 
a copyright holder would receive from tax money would be 
commensurate with the rates in which the public interacted with the 
registered work.65
The main criticism of this proposal is that it would have a negative 
impact on copyright holders and the consumer at large.  Copyright 
holders may not have the funds to register their works with the 
Copyright Office, and those who are unable to do so are barred from 
subsequently seeking compensation from the government when 
another appropriates their work.  Additionally, Fisher’s proposal 
harms the public at large, as all consumers will be forced to pay a 
designated tax on entertainment-related products.  By imposing a 
fixed tax for all, Fisher rewards those who rapidly consume 
copyrighted materials, since they are not required to pay a tax equal 
 
60. WILLIAM W. FISHER, III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 9, 199-258 (2004). 
61. Id. at 249.
62. Id. at 203-06.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 223-34.
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to their amount of consumption, and punishes those who seldom 
interact with copyrighted material, since they will be required to pay 
the same amount in taxes as the avid consumer.  Moreover, Fisher’s 
proposal may cause a decline in the market for electronic goods, since 
his tax can only be imposed on products that have not yet been 
purchased, and users may delay in replacing an old computer solely 
on the basis of the excessive entertainment tax. 
In his 2009 UCLA Law Review proposal, “Girl Talk, Fair Use 
and Three Hundred Twenty-Two Reasons for Copyright Reform,”66 
Brian Pearl advocates for imposing a compulsory licensing scheme 
coupled with a royalty-based system.  Under this mechanism, the 
Mashup Artist would be obligated to compensate the copyright 
holder based on the percentage of revenue generated by the Mashup 
creation.67  If the Mashup Artist either uses multiple copyrighted 
materials in one Mashup or creates a CD consisting of several tracks 
comprised of multiple materials, he would be required to divide the 
royalty fees paid to each copyright holder in proportion to the length 
of the samples used on each track.68
Although on its face, this method appears to be ideal, since 
Mashup Artists who do not generate income from their works would 
not be forced to pay anything for the use of the copyrighted material, 
Pearl’s proposal fails to adequately address the copyright holder’s 
concerns under section 106 of the Copyright Act,
 
69  as it grants 
Mashup Artists free-range to create an alleged ‘non-profit derivative 
work’ and publish that work on the Internet for millions of people to 
observe without having to compensate the copyright holder for its 
use.70
Throughout the course of her career, Pamela Samuelson, a 
nationally recognized pioneer in the realms of digital copyright law, 
 
66. Brian Pearl, Girl Talk, Fair Use and Three Hundred Twenty-Two Reasons for
Copyright Reform, N.Y.U. INTELL. PROP. & ENTM’T L. LEDGER 19 (2009) available at: 
http://jipel.law.nyu.2009/12/girl-talk-fair-use-and-three-hundred-reasons-for-copyright-
reform/. 
67. Id. at 26-27.
68. Id. at 27-28.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
70. See also, Viacom Int’l. Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d 514 (S.D. N.Y. 2010),
540 F.Supp.2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Although this matter centered upon direct copies 
being made of Viacom’s copyrighted content, Viacom distributed cease-and-desist letters 
to Mashup Artists who published their not-for-profit works on YouTube’s video-sharing 
network.). 
   
318 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [35:2 
cyber law, and information policy,71 and distinguished legal Professor 
at the University of California, Berkeley, has written extensively on 
modifying the 1976 Copyright Act to provide for a greater 
understanding amongst the American people of the limitations 
imposed by Copyright Law, particularly in the area of digital 
downloads and technology. 72   Although each of Samuelson’s 
proposals differs in structure, her overreaching theme remains the 
same: the United States Copyright Office must refine its statutory 
damages provision to ensure that due process considerations are 
adequately accommodated, and to prevent those charged with 
secondary liability in infringing the copyrighted material from being 
assessed a penalty grossly disproportionate to their actual offense.73  
Under section 504(c) of the 1976 Copyright Act,74 when a copyright 
holder has filed an infringement claim against someone who 
appropriated his work without authorization to do so, he may elect to 
recover an award of statutory damage in a sum of no less than $750.75  
Where the alleged infringer bears the burden of proof and must 
demonstrate he was unaware his actions were infringing, the court 
may “reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than 
$200” should he prevail on his argument.76  As such, even if the court 
finds the alleged infringer lacked reason to believe he committed 
infringement, he is still subject to a $200 minimum fine, unless an 
employment exception under sections (2)(i) and 2(ii) applies.77
In arguing for a less arbitrary statutory damages provision, 
Samuelson recommends courts look to the type of infringement that 
occurred when awarding copyright statutory damages.  For matters of 
“innocent” infringement, where the alleged infringer did not believe 
his actions constituted infringement, the defendant’s work was not for 
profit, and the copyright holder suffered minimal damage, Samuelson 
suggests courts automatically award the minimum amount of 
 
71. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu 
/~pam/ (last visited May 2, 2011). 
72. Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, UNIVERSITY OF 
CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~pam/papers/Preliminary 
%20Thoughts%20utah.pdf (last visited May 2, 2011). 
73. Id. at 15.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006).
76. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).
77. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)(i) (2006) and 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)(ii) (2006) (carving
out circumstances where the court may remit statutory damages; examples include 
employees of nonprofit educational institutions and public broadcasting entities). 
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statutory damages. 78   For what she describes as “ordinary 
infringement,”79 Samuelson urges courts to award statutory damages 
in an amount commensurate with the amount of damages the original 
copyright holder would have been awarded if he made no election to 
seek statutory damages.80  In determining the amount of damages 
under this type of infringement, Samuelson advises courts to ensure 
actual damages are as accurately approximated as possible to prevent 
infringers from being charged with overly-excessive damages 
disproportionate to the amount of copyright material appropriated.81
While the obvious benefit of Samuelson’s proposal is that it would 
prevent infringers, such as Mashup Artists, from being excessively 
penalized when they do not significantly profit from use of the 
copyrighted material, it does so at the cost of automatically deeming a 
Mashup Artist an infringer, and neglecting to carve out a “safe 
harbor” mechanism in which one may appropriate another’s work 
without being deemed in violation of the Copyright Act.  Under 
Samuelson’s proposal, Mashup Artists are no more protected than 
they would be under the fair use doctrine, since infringement may 
occur “when the [Mashup Artist] did not know his conduct was 
infringing”
 
82 and a Mashup Artist, even one who creates for non-
commercial purposes, would be subject to compensating the 
copyright holder a minimum of “$200.”83
Copyright scholar and Assistant Professor at the University of 
California, Berkeley, Abigail De Kosnik, identifies a two-fold 
  This proposal also decreases 
the likelihood of the judicial system establishing a level of consistency 
amongst other factually similar cases, as she has failed to demonstrate 
a precise measurement for courts to use when calculating damages.  
As Mashups often neglect to serve as replacements of or substitutes 
for the copyrighted material, it will become increasingly difficult for 
the majority of copyright holders to give a near exact estimate of the 
damages suffered, and courts will be forced penalize Mashup Artists 
on a copyright holder’s mere conjecture of lost profits. 
78. Pamela Samuelson et al., Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in
Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 501 (2009). 
79. Samuelson defines “ordinary infringers” as those who “knew they were infringing
or were reckless about infringing, but as to whom other indicia of egregious conduct are 
not present.”  Ordinary infringers may include those who use copyrighted material in a 
commercial manner.  Id. at 503. 
80. Id. at 503.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 449 n. 35.
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approach in altering copyright law to accommodate for the increasing 
impact re-mix culture imposes on present day society, particularly in 
the area of fan-fiction.  Although fan-fiction on its face may bear little 
relation to a Mashup, the circumstances surrounding a fan-fiction 
writer are similar to that of the Mashup Artist, as the fan-fiction 
writer appropriates characters or a plot from a copyrighted work, 
transforms them as he sees fit and submits his work for publication, 
either in stores or via the Internet. 84  De Kosnik’s analysis first 
suggests re-mix artists should be required to compensate copyright 
owners for use of their material before they are able to share their 
new work with others via online publication.85  Second, De Kosnik 
notes fans have compensated the re-mix artist for his work.  Once the 
re-mix artist has been compensated, De Kosnik suggests that he share 
a percentage of these profits with the original copyright holder.86  The 
percentage of shared profits would most likely be commensurate with 
the percentage of the copyright material appropriated in the remix.87
The primary concern with De Kosnik’s two-step analysis is that it 
ignores imperative questions that must be addressed.  Must all 
Mashup Artists strive to receive a profit for their work?  What if fans 
refuse to compensate the Mashup Artist for his creation and he does 
not profit; would he still be forced to pay the copyright holder for use 
of the copyrighted material?  Should the source where the Mashup 
Artist posts his work be responsible for compensating him should fans 
not take to his creation?  Would doing so require video and file-
sharing networks to screen Mashup creations in order to determine if 
they may prove profitable before the network may accept the Mashup 
for online publication?  Would Mashup Artists no longer strive to 
create works if they are no longer able to work anonymously or under 
a pseudonym? 
 
In his 2007 North Carolina Law Review article entitled, “Fixing 
Fair Use,” 88
84. Tushnet, supra note 59, at 3–4; See also, Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,
268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 American University Washington College of Law 
Professor Michael W. Carroll introduces three different ways to alter 
copyright law and eliminate the uncertainty inherent in the fair use 
85. Abigail De Kosnik, Should Fan Fiction Be Free?  4 J. SOC’Y CINEMA & MEDIA 
STUD. 118, 120-21 (2009) (comparing digital appropriation with fan-fiction and 
recommending compensating these artists in order to properly reimburse copyright 
holders for use of their original works). 
86. Id. at 121-23.
87. Id.
88. Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007).
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doctrine.  In his main proposal, Carroll recommends that Congress 
alter the Copyright Act to permit development of a Fair Use Board 
(hereinafter, “Board”) within the United States Copyright Office. 
This three-judge administrative body would retain the exclusive right 
to authorize the use of a copyrighted work in a creation, such as a 
Mashup, without requiring the Mashup Artist compensate the 
copyright owner for the specific use.89  Under this proposal, the 
Mashup Artist would petition the Board for permission to use a 
particular copyrighted work prior to creating the Mashup.90  In filing 
his petition, the Mashup Artist would be required to notify the 
copyright holder that a petition had been made and summarize his 
request to use the particular work.  The copyright holder would then 
receive an opportunity to respond to the petition on the grounds of 
his choosing, or file for a declaratory judgment, but the Board would 
retain the sole discretion in determining whether a work may be 
appropriated.91  Once a decision regarding the petition has been 
made, the petitioner would be free from all liability for the proposed 
use, but the copyright holder may challenge other artist’s similar uses 
of the copyrighted material, as the Board’s ruling would be non-
precedential.92
There are three main concerns surrounding Carroll’s theory, all of 
which prejudice the Mashup Artist in a significant way.  First, 
Carroll’s recommendation could be incredibly time-consuming for 
both the Mashup Artist and the copyright holder, as the Board’s final 
decision is appealable and both parties are given several 
opportunities to file motions outlining their arguments.  By the time a 
verdict has been rendered in the Mashup Artist’s favor, he may no 
longer be interested in using the work, as its social value may have 
depreciated since the filing of his petition.   
  Each Board decision would be appealable and subject 
to administrative and judicial review. 
Second, because the copyright holder is likely to have more of a 
disposable income than the Mashup Artist, particularly in 
circumstances where the copyright is held by a major corporation, the 
Mashup Artist will likely be forced to obtain legal counsel in order to 
successfully prevail against the copyright holder’s legal team.  
Assuming the Board initially renders a decision in the Mashup 
Artist’s favor and the copyright holder exercises his right to appeal, 
89. Id. at 1090.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1091.
92. Id.
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the Mashup Artist may have expended several thousand dollars in 
obtaining legal advice for the opportunity to use one minute of 
copyrighted material before the matter is settled.   
Third, Carroll’s theory fails to distinguish the casual Mashup 
Artist, an individual who creates his work merely for personal 
satisfaction, from the commercial Mashup Artist, an individual who 
may use the copyrighted material to create compact disks for 
worldwide sale and distribution.  Both types of Mashup Artist would 
be required to file a petition with the Board requesting permission to 
use the copyrighted material.  Both would likely obtain legal counsel 
to assist them in presenting their arguments and both would be 
subject to thousands of dollars in legal fees should they need 
assistance in preparing their claim. 
V. Proposal for Reform
In order to best promote uniformity amongst Mashup cases and 
adequately balance concerns of the Mashup Artist, consumer and 
copyright holder, this article outlines a two-step proposal of what 
must occur. First, Congress must impose strict requirements that 
social and video-sharing networks (hereinafter, “network(s)”) must 
follow before they may broadcast a user’s creation.  Second, Congress 
must alter the Copyright Act to include a four-tiered matrix 
specifically designed to address those who develop video or audio 
works comprised of two or more segments of pre-existing copyrighted 
material for personal use, distribution on the Internet, or profit. 
A. Regulating the Internet
Congress must establish a series of requirements that social and
video-sharing websites must meet before they are permitted to accept 
a user’s creation for publication.  Due to the lax regulation of the 
Internet, litigation of infringement claims has become rampant in 
present-day society, as those who wish to upload works consisting of 
copyrighted material are able to do so with ease and at virtually little 
to no cost.  While websites such as YouTube require those who 
upload work onto their networks  (hereinafter, “up-loaders”) to 
establish an online user account before they may publish a work, up-
loaders are not required to submit any personal information aside 
from postal code, gender and date of birth, and there is nothing 
preventing them from establishing their online accounts with 
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inaccurate information.93  Further, up-loaders are not asked specific 
questions about the work they intend to publish, and are merely 
required to check “I accept” under a series of statements informing 
them that their account will be deleted if material they do not 
personally own is uploaded.94
To assist in bringing these networks back to their main purpose of 
providing society with an outlet to share their own creations, but still 
presenting an arena where works such as Mashups may be shared 
worldwide, Congress should require that all video-sharing networks 
make a more detailed assessment of the user and the type of work 
created before allowing for publication.  Under this system, when 
establishing a user account, the up-loader must submit personal 
information similar to that required if he were making an online 
purchase.  His name, address, telephone number, and credit card 
number would all be required and privately maintained by the social 
or video-sharing network.  This information would not be available to 
the public, and the up-loader would be permitted to establish the 
username or pseudonym of his choice under which his creations 
would be published. 
  Because these networks neglect to 
record personal information from the up-loader and fail to obtain 
specific details about the work being uploaded, they become a virtual 
un-regulated breeding ground for copyright violators; anyone can 
post anything without a likelihood of facing liability, as it is often 
time-consuming and difficult for copyright owners to browse 
databases searching for violations. 
Aside from the up-loader’s personal information, the network 
would also be required to gather data particularly related to the 
content being uploaded.  After an up-loader accurately submits his 
personal information with the network, he would be directed to a 
second series of questions where he would be asked if his work uses 
material created by another.  If it does use such material, the up-
loader would be required to submit the name and creator of the 
material being appropriated along with the amount (in minutes) of 
each appropriated work.  If an up-loader submits false information 
under the first set of questions, he would not be directed to the 
second set.  If he submits false information on the second set of 
93. Create a New Google Account, GOOGLE, http://accounts.google.com/
SignUp?service=youtube (last visited May 2, 2012). 
94. Copyright Tips, GOOGLE, http://www.youtube.com/t/howto_copyright (last
visited May 2, 2011).  (YouTube tells users before they create an account, “Uploading 
materials that you do not own is a copyright violation and against the law.  If you upload 
material you do not own, your account will be deleted.”). 
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questions and states his work does not contain material appropriated 
by another when it actually does, his credit card would automatically 
be charged $200, half of which would go to the artist(s) whose work is 
appropriated, while the other half is paid to the particular network. 
These requirements would enable the network to compile a 
database of works uploaded so that they would be able to compensate 
the copyright owner directly from the up-loader’s account 
commensurate with the fees established under the four-tiered matrix 
described in section B of this proposal. 
Although critics may urge that imposing such strict requirements 
on the up-loader may prevent users from uploading information onto 
video-sharing networks, in theory it does the exact opposite. 
Presently, all video-sharing networks do not allow one to post the 
copyrighted work of another; anyone who uploads another’s 
copyrighted material will automatically lose their account, and their 
creation, once identified by network representatives, will be 
removed.95
Further, imposing regulations on these social networks does not 
remove a Mashup Artist’s right to remain anonymous in publication, 
as viewers of the uploaded content do not receive any information 
about its creator other than the information which the artist wishes to 
display.  Additionally, this restriction does not inhibit creation or 
punish those who do not choose to upload material copyrighted by 
another, as users who upload works that are entirely theirs will not be 
required to pay an uploading fee. 
  Under the proposed regulation, the amount of works 
permissibly uploaded to these sharing networks would dramatically 
increase, as users would be able to upload copyrighted and non-
copyrighted information without the fear of having their account and 
posting removed, or facing thousands of dollars in litigation costs. 
This theory is also consistent with the fundamental aim of copyright 
law to further progress, as all creators will be able to use video-
sharing networks specifically tailored to their individual creations. 
B. Imposition of a Four-Tiered Matrix
In order to determine the amount of compensation copyright
holders are entitled to receive for unauthorized use of their 
copyrighted materials in Mashups, Congress must create a scheme 
that acknowledges the numerous types of Mashup creations and 
provides a uniform method to adequately and evenly compensate 
copyright holders. 
95. Id.
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The only way for copyright law to achieve this delicate balance is 
for Congress to create a four-tiered matrix within the Copyright Act 
that will particularly pertain to Mashups as defined in section II(A) of 
this article.  The matrix would be structured in the shape of a 
pyramid, and each of the four tiers would be separated based on the 
type and location of infringement.  Based on the type and location of 
infringement that has occurred, a Mashup Artist may not be required 
to compensate the original holder for use of the copyrighted material, 
or he may be forced to share a percentage of his profits proportionate 
to the amount earned or quantity of work appropriated. 
The first tier is designed specifically to protect the “Casual-
Masher;” an individual who creates a work for his own pleasure using 
two or more copyrighted materials, does not publish his creation on 
the Internet or on any other social-video sharing platform, and 
receives no profit from his compilation.  This Masher may share his 
works with friends or even display it in a large setting, such as a 
lecture or banquet hall, but neither he nor anyone else may publish or 
profit from the creation.  If a Mashup Artist’s work falls within this 
tier, the original copyright holder automatically would be barred from 
seeking damages and alleging infringement. 
For example, Jim, a “Casual Masher,” creates a six-minute 
Mashup of scenes from various Walt Disney and Pixar films that he 
shows to his family and friends at a local coffee shop.  Jim does not 
get paid for this work, and he has not posted it online.  Under the first 
tier of the matrix, Jim’s use of the copyrighted material would 
automatically be presumed “fair.”  As such, Jim is automatically 
protected from all liability and is not required to compensate either 
Disney or Pixar for his use of the copyrighted materials. 
The second and third tiers of the matrix resemble the mechanical 
licensing requirement established in section 115 of the 1976 Copyright 
Act,96
Dedicated to the “Low-Scale-Masher,” the second tier of the 
proposal applies to the individual who creates a work for his own 
pleasure using two or more copyrighted materials, publishes that 
work on social or video sharing platforms that are privately funded 
and do not contain advertisements, and receives no profit from his 
 as they require the Mashup Artist compensate the copyright 
holder based on the amount of work appropriated. 
96. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (Establishing a compulsory license for those who make
and distribute physical and digital phonorecords.  Users must compensate the copyright 
holder at a current rate of 9.1 cents or 1.75 cents per minute of playing time or fraction 
thereof, whichever is greater.). 
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compilation.  Under this tier, a “Low-Scale-Masher” who falls within 
the above definition must compensate the copyright holder in a sum 
proportionate to the amount of copyrighted work appropriated at a 
rate of three cents per minute.  This charge will be made directly to or 
taken from the credit card or bank account the Mashup Artist listed 
when he developed his user account with the online network.  This 
modest cost addresses the needs of both the Mashup Artist and the 
copyright holder, as the Mashup Artist will be able to publish his 
work at little cost, and the copyright holder, even if he does not suffer 
detriment, will be compensated for the use of his creation.  Personal 
homepages would automatically fall within this tier. 
The third tier is relatively similar to the second, only it pertains to 
the “Mid-Scale-Masher,” one who creates a work for his own 
pleasure using two or more copyrighted materials, publishes that 
work on social or video sharing platforms that are funded by 
consumers or advertisements or a combination of both, and receives 
no profit from his compilation.  A “Mid-Scale-Masher” who meets 
these requirements would be required to compensate the copyright 
holder in a sum proportionate to the amount of copyrighted work 
appropriated at a rate of six cents per minute.  Like the charges made 
to the “Low-Scale-Masher’s” user account, the fees a  “Mid-Scale-
Masher” must pay would be directly charged to or taken from the 
account on file with the video-sharing network.  Networks that would 
automatically fall in this tier would include YouTube, Blip.tv, and 
Yahoo Video.  All video-sharing networks that offer both a fee and 
no-fee version for viewers would also be included within this tier. 
Putting the second and third tiers into practice with assistance 
from the hypothetical created in tier one, imagine Jim decides to post 
his Disney/Pixar Mashup on the Internet and that two of the six 
minutes consist of Disney footage, while the remaining four minutes 
are copyrighted by Pixar.  Depending on where Jim chooses to 
publish his work, he may be responsible for paying Disney and Pixar 
either 6 and 8 cents respectively, (if he publishes the work on his 
personal homepage), or 12 and 16 cents respectively (if he wishes to 
post the work on YouTube), for use of the copyrighted material. 
Either way, the Mashup Artist is not likely to be deterred by the low 
cost in publishing his work, the consumer is able to view his creation, 
and the copyright holder is able to receive compensation. 
The final tier pertains directly to the “High-Scale-Masher,” one 
who directly profits financially from his work.  There are two types of 
Mashup Artists that fall within this category.  The first type of 
Mashup Artist is known as the “One-Track-Masher,” who creates a 
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single Mashup that he sells for profit.  Throughout his career, he may 
create hundreds of Mashups, but the “One-Track-Masher” sells each 
Mashup separately as a single track.  Under this fourth tier, if a “One-
Track-Masher” receives funds for the sale of his Mashup, he would be 
required to compensate each copyright holder at a rate of two percent 
of the gross profits received.  This two percent restriction could 
legitimately require the Mashup Artist to relinquish all profits if he 
were to use more than fifty works in his creation.  However, it is the 
superior alternative to requiring him to pay based on the proportion 
of copyrighted materials appropriated, since the Mashup Artist will 
only have to compensate the copyright holder if his work profits.  The 
second type of “High-Scale-Masher” is the “Multiple-Masher,” an 
artist such as DJ Girl Talk,97 who creates several different Mashups, 
separates these Mashups into individual tracks, and compiles them 
onto one compact disk or record, which he sells for profit.  Each of 
DJ Girl Talk’s albums contains samples from over hundreds of 
copyrighted materials.98  Instead of requiring the “Multiple-Masher” 
to distribute two percent of his profits to over a hundred different 
copyright holders, he would be required to compensate the copyright 
holder in proportion to the length of copyrighted material used at a 
fixed rate of ten cents per minute per copy sold.  If DJ Girl Talk uses 
twenty minutes of a copyrighted song in his album and sells 200 
copies of the album, he would be required to compensate the 
copyright holder $400.99
The difference in regulation between the “Multiple-Masher” and 
“One-Track-Masher” serves as recognition of the various Mashing 
methods available, and ensures that Mashup Artists are not grossly 
financially burdened in a manner disproportionate to the amount of 
copyrighted material appropriated. 
 
Overall, this four-tiered Matrix is an ideal and uniform means of 
regulating Mashups, as it adequately addresses the needs of the 
Mashup Artist, consumer, and copyright holder in an un-biased and 
predictable manner without inhibiting the First Amendment goals 
and historical aims of copyright law.100
97. Pearl, supra note 66.
  It satisfies the concerns within 
the Mashup community, as it provides clear guidelines as to the 
amount of compensation a Mashup Artist must furnish to copyright 
98. Id.
99. 10 cents per minute x 20 minutes of copyrighted material = $2 must be paid to the
copyright holder per album; $2 per album x 200 albums sold = $400 must be paid to the 
copyright holder. 
100. Halbert, supra note 50, at 953 (2009).
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holders in creating his work, and it eliminates the uncertainty 
prevalent within today’s Mashup community.101  It is also malleable, 
and alters in form to recognize the various types of Mashups that may 
be created and the various locations where they may be published. 
Further, it eliminates the fair use doctrine’s present bias in favor of 
commercial interests102
Critics of this proposal may urge that a statutory licensing scheme 
like that reflected within the proposed Matrix would be impractical, 
as the majority of Mashup Artists create works for non-commercial 
purposes and would be forced to either cease creating works or go 
into debt in order to pursue their interest in developing Mashups. 
This concern is outweighed by the first tier of the Matrix, which 
grants the “Casual Masher” full discretion to use the copyrighted 
work as he deems fit, so long as his creation is not published and he 
does not profit from its creation.  Further, the small fees Mashup 
Artists will have to pay to use copyrighted material in a manner 
outlined in tiers two and three of the Matrix are not significant 
enough to deter the increase of Mashup creations. 
 and makes copyright law more amenable to 
technological advancements without ignoring the needs and rights of 
copyright holders.  It also recognizes the needs of consumers in a 
manner unlike any other proposal, as it allows for online publication 
of all works- not just those original to the up-loader, without imposing 
a mandatory or blanket tax.  Finally, it is an ideal proposal for 
copyright holders, as they are able to receive guaranteed 
compensation for the published use of their copyrighted material, 
even when the Mashup Artist does not profit from his creation. 
Another criticism of the proposal is that current Mashups located 
on the Internet would not be subject to this Matrix, while future 
works would be.  This is certainly not the case, as the proposed 
scheme would require that every video-sharing network entirely wipe 
their online database and only accept works once they have re-
formatted their user account registration process consistent with 
section V(A) of this proposal.  This way, every up-loader has 
completed the necessary registration process, and is aware of their 
obligations to compensate copyright holders should their work 
include material that is not their own.  Although wiping entire 
databases may prove time-consuming and costly to video-sharing 
networks, these networks have historically skirted around liability as 
secondary infringers, solely on the basis that they did not post the 
101. Id. at 954.
102. Id.
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infringing material or have a belief that a particular posting contained 
infringing material.  It is certainly time they take responsibility and 
facilitate compliance with copyright laws. 
VI. Conclusion
In order for copyright law to remain prevalent in today’s 
primarily digital world, it must be altered to foster, not inhibit 
creativity.  Mashup Artists and their creations are different from 
those who commit acts of pure digital piracy, yet current copyright 
law under the fair use doctrine fails to treat them as such.  In order to 
balance the inherent conflict between free speech, creativity, and the 
law, Congress must adapt the Copyright Act and bridge the gap 
between what the law protects and how people create.103  The only 
way to bridge this gap and accommodate the creator, consumer, and 
copyright holder is to impose heightened requirements on social and 
video-sharing networks and develop a matrix specifically tailored to 
assess all matters pertaining to this new way of creating.  The twenty-
first century is moving forward with or without copyright law.  ‘It is 
only fair that copyright follow suit. 
103. Id.
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* * *
